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RECENT CASES
evident trend toward greater emphasis upon policy considerations88
this opinion seems conspicuously erroneous and unrealistic. This
lack of accord from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is extremely danger-
ous. It leads to positions that cannot possibly be reconciled with
one another and this necessarily must breed forum-shopping.
In the final analysis each court must determine whether the
mechanistic stability and uniformity of the lex loci delecti doctrine
with its thoughtless application is worth the price that must be paid.
It seems that it is not, because as has been pointed out, courts
have always found ways of avoiding its application, and because
it stands as a monumental obstacle in the path of progressing to-
ward meaningful and necessary public policy considerations. The
overwhelming majority of writers are opposed to its retention, and
contemporary cases are running clearly contra to it. The problem,
of course, is that there is a good deal of spirited debate as to what
is the proper method for analyzing and solving these problems. At
the present time, the choice of law doctrine finds itself in a muddled
and embarrassing posture. Only time and a creative, responsible
judiciary can lead us to a more sound and consistent position. Minne-
sota appears to be headed clearly in the right direction.
SAL MARTOCHE
CRIMINAL LAW-ADMISSIONS BY ACCUSED-TACIT ADMISSION BY
SILENCE-While in jail on a charge of burglary, the confession of
the defendant's confederate was read to the defendant by the police,
after the defendant was informed by the police of his right to
remain silent. The defendant, Staino, remained silent or periodically
said, "I have nothing to say " His failure to deny was received in
evidence at the trial as a tacit admission and the defendant appealed
his conviction. The equally divided Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the conviction and held the evidence was admissible under
the tacit admissions doctrine.' Commonwealth v Cavell, 207 Pa.
Super 274, 217 A.2d 824 (1966)
The tacit admissions doctrine 2 is an exception to the exclusion-
38. Babcock v. Jackson, aupra note 26, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d. 796 (1964) , Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d. 553 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
1. The dissenting justices said the doctrine violated the rules of self-incrimination.
2. [W]hen a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incrim-
inating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted
by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the
fact of his failure to deny are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the
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ary rules of hearsay evidence s and is predicated on the presump-
tion that the accused is more likely to acquiesce to a true charge
than a false charge.4 One theory of interpretation states that the
failure to deny the accusation shows that the accused intended to
communicate agreement and thus, by his conduct, adopted the ac-
cusation. " Another theory maintains that the accused's failure to
deny was behavior showing a consciousness that he was guilty 1
The two theories are often difficult to distinguish, as is shown by an
opinion of the Supreme Court of California in which the two doctrines
were used interchangably 7
It is important to point out that the incriminating statement is
not admitted as substantive proof of the fact asserted therein, but
is only an element necessary to show the substantive evidence of the
accused's reaction or response when confronted with the incrimin-
ating statement." The paradox in the doctrine is readily appar-
ent, for, if the accused specifically asserts his constitutional right
to remain silent or denies the charge, the statement and reaction
would be inadmissible;9 if, however, he relies on a statement by
the police concerning his right to remain silent, his exercise of such
a right would be damaging, admissible evidence. Staino's reply and
his silence was more indicative of a desire to exercise his right to
silence than it was an indication of acquiescence. Although an ad-
monition is given to the jury to consider only the conduct and not
to consider the statement itself as evidence, the prejudice factor
remains to influence the jury and affect their deliberations, 0 as well
as to increase the chance that the implied admission will be treated
as a confession."
The prerequisites to admissibility of a tacit admission have dif-
fered among the jurisdictions, but, generally, all include the require-
truth of the charges thus made." Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d. 889,
890 (1943) , Comment, 31 U.CHLLREV. 556 (1964), Developments in the Law--Confessions,
79 HARV. L.REv. 935, 1041-1044 (1966).
3. 4 WIGmoR, EVIDENCE, § 1071 (3d. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WiOmORE].
4. People v. Nitti, 312 Ili. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924). The idea has also been expressed
in the Latin phrase. Qui tactet consenti Videtur - The silence of a party implies his
consent. Compare Mark 15 3, 4, 5, (King James).
5. 4 WIcapoP, op. cit. supra note 3, at 68.
6. See, e.g., State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). Wigmore seems to
suggest this theory to be preferable since it includes such intentional admissions. 4 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 1072 (6) (a). Accord, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507, comment b.
7. People v. Simmons, 28 Ca.2d. 699, 172 P.2d 18 (1946).
8. See People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 229 Pac. 40 (1924) Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1235
(1932), Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1510 (1938). Infirmities in the Incriminating statement such
as lack of Personal knowledge by the accuser or Inadmissibility on other grounds have
been held not to affect the admissibilty of such testimony. See e.g. Nunn v. State, 143
Ga. 451, 85 S.E. 346 (1915) Commonwealth v. Hoff, 315 Mass. 551, 53 N.E.2d. 680 (1944).
But see People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272, 56 N.E. 750 (Ct. App. 1909). Naturally, a tacit
admission without other proof is not sufficient evidence for a conviction.
9. E.g., Kern v. State, 237 Ind. 144, N.E.2d. 705 (1957) , Commonwealth v.
Towber, 190 Pa. Super. 93, 132 A.2d. 917 (1959).
10. Commonwealth v. Vallone, supra note 2, at 898 (dissent).
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ments that the accusation occur within the accused's hearing and
that it be understood by him as an accusation of himself12 which
would naturally provoke or demand a denial from an innocent per-
son. 8 Some jurisdictions have held the doctrine wholly inapplicable
as self-incrimination 4 or have followed the Massachusetts rule1 5 pro-
hibiting such evidence if the accused is under arrest at the time
of the accusation and tacit admission.'8 Other jurisdictions have
modified the Massachusetts rule and have held that arrest alone is
merely a factor that deserves consideration as one of the circum-
stances under which the accusation was made.'
7
The instant case, decided March 24, 1966, is an example of the
apparent confusion following the cases of Malloy v Hogan' and
Escobedo v Illinots8 and the reluctance of some courts to expand
and interpret the guidelines for criminal procedure established in
those cases. 20  The Supreme Court in the Malloy case emphasized
the "right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in an unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty
. for such silence."' 2' When confronted with the confession and
direct charge in the instant case, it should have been evident that
the "accusatory stage" noted in Escobedo22 had been reached and
that Staino should have had an absolute constitutional right to re-
main silent.2 8 The rules enunciated in Malloy and Escobedo should
have provided the impetus to eliminate the doctrine since it is only
applicable when the investigation has focused upon a specific mdivi-
dual suspect, amply demonstrated here by Staino's arrest and the
11. See, People v. Bracanonte, 197 Cal. App.2d. 385, 17 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1961) Miller
v. State, 231 Md. 215, 189 A.2d. 635 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Irving v. State, 92 Miss. 662, 47 So. 518 (1908), 22A C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 734 (1) SlA C.J.S. Evidence § 294-296.
13. People v. Simmons, eupra note 7 at 25.
14. E.g., McGrew v. State, 293 P.2d. 381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956). Most federal
courts are included, e.g., United States v. Lo Blondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1943). Most
jurisdictions allow the jury to decide the question of voluntariness and validity. E.g.,
Thurmond v. State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So.2d 44 (1953). This would appear to be contrary
to the rule enunciated in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. (1964) requiring a separate hearing
to determine voluntariness. Accord, United States v. Moroney, 231 F.Supp. 154 (W.D.Pa.
1964), People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Ct App. 1965).
15. Commonwealth v. Kenny, 12 Met 235, 46 Am. Dec. 672 (Mass. 1847).
16. People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (Ct. App. 1933). But see,
People v. Simmons, aupra note 7, at 27 "[T]he determiiative point is not whether the
defendant is under arrest at the time of the accusation, but whether circumstances are
such that a reply is called for and the defendant is free to speak spontaneously."
17. E.g., People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d. 661, 276 P.2d 801 (1954) cert. denied, 349 U.S.
905 (1955) State v. Fogg, 79 S.D. 576, 115 N.W.2d 889 (1962).
18. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
20. The court in the instant case noted that a new trial "would be a waste of
precious Judicial time" and that "[c]rime has greatly increased as a result of judicial
leniency" due to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The doctrine of tacit admissions
by silence is viable in civil actions. O.S. Paulson Mercantile Co. v. Seaver, 8 N.D. 215,
77 N.W 10-01 (1898), Annot, 70 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1960).
21. 378 U.S. at 8.
22. 378 U.S. at 492.
23. People v. Stewart, 226 Cal. App.2d 27, 45 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Dist. CL App. 1965).
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specific accusation by the police. The Supreme Court of California
interpreted the Escobedo and Malloy rulings as eliminating the use
of any tacit admission. 24 Regardless of the apparent constitutional
conflicts and the open possibilities for flagrant abuses, 25 the doctrine
has developed deep roots in many state criminal prosecutions, 26 al-
though never decided directly by case law in North Dakota.
27
There is little doubt that the United State Supreme Court will
abrogate the use of the tacit admissions doctrine in criminal pro-
ceedings.2 8 The warning of the privilege of silence has now become
an absolute prerequisite in "overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere, ' 29 and to assure the awareness of the
accused of the consequences of waiving his privilege. The accused
may waive his right, but no amount of circumstantial evidence that
the person may have been aware of this right to silence will suf-
fice to replace a clear, conscious waiver. The burden of proof of
waiver is on the state. It would appear absurd to say that Staino's
failure to specifically assert his right to remain silent served as a
waiver and thus evidence of an admission. The Escobedo and
Miranda decisions concerning confessions clearly indicate the Court's
insistence on naturalness and free and reasoned choice in confessions,
emphasizing primarily that the accused's trial right be protected
from unfair methods during the investigatory and interrogatory proc-
esses.
In attempting to justify the tacit admissions doctrine, the com-
parison has often been made to the evidence of a person's flight
from the scene of the crime as also showing an act inconsistent
with innocence.3 0 The comparison is ill-conceived and highly ques-
tionable since flight involves a positive act and silence a negative
reaction,31 in addition to relying too heavily upon the personality
of the individual. Another possible parallel rationale might have
been the allowing of comment on the defendant's failure to testify; 
82
however, in Griffin v California,5 the Supreme Court held that
24. People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal.2d 659, 47 Cal. Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116 (1965) , People
v. Ridley 63 Cal.2d 671, 47 Cal. Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124 (1965).
25. See, e.g., Flaherty v. United States, 355 F.2d 924 (1st Cir. 1966).
26. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-409 (expressly approving doctrine). Compare, CAL.
Evm. CODE § 1221, and MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 93-401-27 (3).
27. See State v. Chase, 17 N.D. 429, 117 N.W 537 (1908) (discussing doctrine but
immaterial in deciding case).
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n.37 (1966). "In accord with our decision
today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege when he Is under police custodial Interrogation. The prosecution may not, there-
fore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusa-
tion."
29. Id. at 468.
30. Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943).
31. Id. at 900.
32. See State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).
33. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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such comment imposed a penalty on the defendant for asserting his
consititutional privilege. Similar reasoning should seemingly have
been applicable to the silence in response to the accusation m the
instant case. Those infrequently accused of crime may believe si-
lence to be the safest course to follow or believe they have an un-
qualified right to remain silent under questioning by police. One
federal court of appeals noted that the law otherwise would re-
quire a warning that: "If you say anything, it will be used against
you; if you do not say anything, that will be used against you.""
Clearly then, the tacit admissions doctrine should have been abrogat-
ed before the present dicta m the Miranda decision.
DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER
34. McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928).
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